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LAW AND FACT PATTERNS
IN COMMON LAW WATER
POLLUTION CASES
by PETER N. DAVIS @
he federal Clean Water Act' and par-
allel state statutes2 are the primary
sources of law regulating the quality of
surface watercourses and groundwater. Com-
mon law cases supplement regulatory law by
dealing with localized pollution problems
which comprehensive regulations cannot ad-
dress. While the citizen suit provision in the
Clean Water Act allows private suits to re-
quire compliance with the Act,3 it does not
provide for individual damages.' Hence,
common law lawsuits have an important role
to play in protecting the individuals right to
water quality.
This article summarizes the various legal
theories used in 1401 common law lawsuits
involving water pollution and describes the
various factual circumstances under which
those theories have been used.5 This analy-
sis suggests when various theories might be
used and the likelihood of success for plain-
tiffs. This article includes a series of tables
showing the types of legal theories used in
cases in Missouri and surrounding states and
an appendix of Missouri water pollution
cases employing these various doctrines.
PART I
LEGAL THEORIES USED IN WATER
PoLLuTIoN CASES
The theories used in common law water
pollution cases are: private nuisance, public
nuisance, negligence, violation of riparian
rights (in eastern states), violation of prior
appropriation rights (in western states), vio-
lation of groundwater allocation rules, viola-
tion of diffused surface water rules, strict
liability, trespass, unconstitutional taking, vio-
lation of certain statutes, prescription and
the public trust doctrine.6 In addition, there
are a large number of cases which do not cite
any legal theory.
A. PRIVATE NUISANCE
Private nuisance is the most commonly
used legal theory to deal with water pollu-
tion, followed in 531 cases (38%)." A private
nuisance is defined as an unreasonable and
substantial nontrespassory interference with
the use and enjoyment of another's land,'
impairing the fitness of land for the ordinary
uses of life.' Typical examples of private
nuisances created by water pollution are
contamination of domestic, livestock, and
public water supplies; creation of odors in-
terfering with places of habitation or employ-
ment; and destruction of the fertility of soil.
B. PUBLIC NUISANCE
Public nuisance is the fourth most com-
monly used theory, followed in 181 cases
(13%).io A public nuisance is defined as an
unreasonable interference with a right com-
mon to the general public so as to endanger
or injure the property, health, safety, or
comfort of a considerabie number of per-
sons-" Typicallexamples of public nuisances
cree;tedbywaterpolkstionare contamination
of pubic water supplies, a group of domestic
1 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1986). See generally, 1 F. GRAD, ENviRoNMEwA. LAw ch. 3(1973-1992); 1 J. DAVIDSON & 0. DoF. , FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAl REuLATON ch.
2 (1989); S. NovicK & M. MELLON, LAw OF ENvIRoNMENTAL. PRoTECnoN ch. 12 (1987-1992); 2 W. RODGERs, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (2d ed. 1986, supp. 1992); 5 WATER AND WATER
RIGHTs (R. Beck 2d ed. 1991, supp. 1992); Davis. Federal and State Water Quality Regulation and Law in Missouri, 55 Mo. L. REv. 411 (1990) Ihereinafter cited as Water
Quality Regulation]
2 See. e.g., Missouri Clean Water Law. RSMo §§ 644.006-.141 (1986, supp. 1992). See generally. 1 Missouni ENVIRONMENTAL LAw ch. 8 (1991-92); Davis, Water Quality
Regulation. supra note .
3 Clean Water Act § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1986). See generally, Davis, Water Quality Regulation, supra note , at 434-38. There is no citizen suit provision
in the Missouri statute.
4 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammer Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling. Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.
1979). cert. denied 444 U.S. 1025 (1980)
5 This article is drawn from review of over 1350 cases nationwide, the vast bulk of all reported cases. These cases have been found through the use of digests, electronic legal
data bases. examination of prior cases cited in cases, and Shepards. No single research technique reveals more than a small portion of all reported cases. My forthcoming book
on water pollution law and regulation will be the first publication with a comprehensive list of cases, listed by theory and jurisdiction. Those lists will contain notations of the fact
situations and legal results in each case. This article will cite many representative cases, but for space reasons contains a comprehensive list only for Missouri.
6 Some of these theories, particularly private and public nuisance. violation of riparian rights and violation of groundwater allocation rules, have been discussed in published treatises
and articles. Others have not been discussed before. See, e.g., 1 RoDEts. supra note , ch. 2, at 28-168; 1 F. GRo. supra note, §§ 3.02(1), 3.05(3); D. Sami & K. MANASTER,
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAw chs. 3-4 (1989-1992); Davis. Water Quality Regulation, supra note , at 484-502; Davis. Protecting Waste Assimilation Streamflows by the Law
of Water Allocation, Nuisance. and Public Trust, and by Environmental Statutes. 28 NAT. RESOURcVs J. 357 (1988): Davis. Groundwater Pollution: Case Law Theories
for Relief, 39 Mo. L. REv. 117 (1974) Ihereinafter cited as Groundwater Pollution]; Davis. Theories in Water Pollution Litigation. 1971 Wis. L. REv. 738 [hereinafter cited
as Water Pollution Litigation]; Comment, Private Remedies for Water Pollution. 70 Co um. L. Rev. 734. 738-44 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Private Remedies 735-744.
7 See Table A.
8 RESTATEMENT 2D. ToRTs§822.832.849(1979); Krienerv. Turkey Valley CommunitySch. Dist., 212 N.W.2d 526.531 (Iowa 1973)lschool sewagelagoon effluent discharged
into stream caused odors around farmhouse and polluted livestock waterl. On Missouri private nuisance law generally, see Comment, The Law of Private Nuisance in Missouri.
44 Mo. L. Rtv. 20 (1979)
9 Bower v. Hog Builders. Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784. 795-97 (Mo. 1970) Ifeedlot sewage lagoon effluent flowed across boundary, causing odors and polluting a livestock watering
pond); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F.Supp. 303. 319 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). off d in part, rev'd in part 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988 -Tenn.) Ileachate from unlicensed
chemical waste landfill polluted domestic wells).
10 See Table A.
11 RESTATEMENT 2D. Tom § 821B (1977); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv.. Inc.. 426 N.E.2d 824. 834 (111. 981) off'd 396 N.E.2d 552 (111. 979) )leachate
from hazardous waste landfill allegedly would pollute groundwaterl; New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1050 (2d Cir. 1985) thazardous waste storage
facility leaks polluted groundwater. J5I M E LP RI
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or livestock water supplies, or creation of
widespread odors interfering with places of
habitation or causing nausea and illness.
A public nuisance suit usually is enforce-
able only by a public official, such as a public
health officer or prosecuting attorney;12 but,
if an individual is specially damaged or in-
jured, a public nuisance may be enforced
independently by the individual.'3
C. NEGLIGENCE
Negligence is the second most commonly
used theory, followed in 271 cases (19%)."
Negligence is "conduct which falls below the
standard established by law for the protec-
tion of others against unreasonable risk or
harm," and involves a want of care, or an
activity not conducted in a reasonable and
prudent manner.' 5 Negligence focuses on
conduct, rather than on consequences.'6 It
is directed at the predictability of the contam-
ination or of the injury or damage caused by
defendant's activity, not at the degree or
nature of that injury or damage."
D. RIPARIAN RIGHTS
Riparian rights is the third most com-
monly used theory, followed in 222 cases
(16%)." The riparian doctrine is employed
universally by thirty-one states in the eastern
United States, including Missouri, to allocate
water in watercourses between users. It is
employed in cases involving pollution of
watercourses as well, because the doctrine
has always had a qualitative component in
addition to its better known quantitative
component.
The riparian doctrine provides that each
landowner whose land abuts a watercourse
has a coequal right to use a fair share of the
water supply. Each riparian has two contra-
dictory rights. First, each riparian is entitled
to natural flow, that is, to have the water flow
in its natural quantity and quality. Second,
each riparian on the watercourse has an
equal right to make reasonable uses of that
water, including consumptive uses, even if
some alteration in quantity, quality, or flow
pattern occurs.'9 Reasonableness is deter-
mined by comparing the claimant riparian's
uses with those of the other affected riparians.
Each state has had to emphasize either
natural flow right or the reasonable use right.
Twenty-five of the thirty-one eastern states
have adopted the reasonable use emphasis
of the riparian doctrine,20 which allows each
riparian to make reasonable uses even if
some alteration in quantity, quality, or flow
pattern occurs.2' Six states continue to fol-
low the natural flow emphasis.2 1
The riparian doctrine applies to waste
discharges as well as to water uses. 3 The
natural flow concept requires that there be
no adulteration of natural water quality and
that the natural purity be maintained.24 The
reasonable use concept allows a reasonable
use of water, even if some lessening of
natural water quality occurs." Comparative
reasonableness is the standard employed in
most riparian pollution cases.26 That some
waste discharges are permitted under the
reasonable use concept of riparian rights is
made evident by cases accepting the concept
and denying relief because they did not
unreasonably interfere with other riparian
uses.27
E. PRIOR APPROPRIATION
12 RESTATEMENT 2D, TORTs § 821C(2)(b) (1977); AttorneyGeneral ex rel. Township of Wyoming v. City of Grand Rapids, 141 N.W. 890, 900 (Mich. 1913).
13 RESTATEMENT 2D, TORTs §§ 821C(1), 821C(2Xa) (1977); Schoen v. Kansas City, 65 Mo.App. 134. 138 (1895).
14 See Table A.
15 RESTATEMENT 2D, ToRTS § 282 (1965); Green v. Asher Coal Mining Co., 377 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Ky. 1964).
16 RESTATEMENT 2D. TORTS § 282 (1965) ("negligence is conduct"); Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 465 P.2d 314, 319 (Mont. 1970).
17 Ressler v. Gerlach, 149 A.2d 158, 160 (Pa. 1959) (defendant should have known his conduct would lead to another's injury).
18 See Table A.
19 Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964). On the ripanian doctrine generally, see 1 WATER AND WATER RIGrs, supra note , § 6 .01(a)(34), 7.02-.03; A. TARLocK.
LAw oF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES ch. 3 (1988-92); Davis. Water Quality Regulation, supra note , at 432-39.
20 Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts. Michigan, Minnesota. Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania. South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
21 Harris v. Brooks. 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955); Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1980).
22 Connecticut, Kentucky, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio. and Rhode Island. See, e.g., McCord v. Big Bros. Movement, 185 A. 490 (N.J. 1936); RFSTATEMENr 2D. TORmS§ 850 (1978).
23 On the water quality aspects of the riparian doctrine generally, see 1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTs, supra note , § 7.03(e); A. TARLOCK,, supra note . § 3.13: 1 W. RODGERS.,
supra note , § 2.19; Davis, Water Quality Regulation, supra note , at 489-90; Davis, Water Pollution Litigation. supro note, at 742-49; Comment. Private Remedies,
supra note , at 735-38.
24 Beaunit Corp. v. Alabama Power Co., 370 F.Supp. 1044,1052 (N.D. Ala. 1973) [peak hydroplant operation reduced minimum flow need for waste assimilation by industrial
waste treatment plantl; McArthur v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp.. 45 P.2d 807, 815 (Cal. 1935) (hydroelectric diversion caused stagnation of livestock & irrigation water supply);
H.B. Bowling Coal Co. v. Ruffner 100 S.W. 116, 119 (fenn. 1906) lacid mine drainage pumped into stream corroded factory boiler and polluted domestic & livestock water
supplyl.
25 Tetherington v. Dank Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 83 N.E. 1048. 1049 (111. 908) Icoal mine debris covered farmland after tailings settling in reservoir washed out; Ferguson
v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 42 N.W. 448, 449 (Ia. 1889) Isugar beet refuse discharged into stream polluted domestic & livestock water supplyl.
26 Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, 122 A.2d 233 (N.J.Super 1956); For a functional analysis of how the riparian rights doctrine has been applied to water
pollution cases. see W. RoDcEs, supra note , § 2.19.
27 See e.g. Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 42 N.W. 448. 449 (la. 1899) [sugar beet refuse discharged into stream polluted domestic & livestock water supply - allegations
not provedl; Helfrich v. Catonsville Water Co.. 22 A. 72. 73 (Md. 1891) Icattle in stream polluted public water supply - trial court injunction quashed).
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Prior appropriation theory is used in ten
western cases (1%).21 The 18 western states
follow the prior appropriation doctrine in
allocating water between users. 29 The prior
appropriation doctrine provides that users
are entitled to take their full appropriations
of water in historic chronological order of
first use until the water supply is exhausted.
In times of shortage, the latest appropriators
will be cut off in inverse historic order until
demand equals supply. That chronological
allocation is described by the maxim "first in
time, first in right."Io Beginning in 1890, all
western states enacted statutory permit sys-
tems and established state agencies to ad-
minister prior appropriation rights.
Many prior appropriation waste discharge
cases hold that a senior appropriator cannot
expect to retain natural quality of flow, but
must expect some deterioration in quality by
the activities of upstream junior appropria-
tors. However, the senior appropriator is
entitled to be free from unreasonable inter-
ference with the fair enjoyment of their prior
appropriative right by material deterioration
of water quality, t and some cases hold that
an upstream junior appropriator may cause
no degradation.
Courts in most western states have not
determined the water quality rights of junior
appropriators. But the few jurisdictions con-
sidering the question disagree whether a
downstream junior appropriator must ac-
cept degraded water quality resulting from a
senior appropriator's use. The California
and Washington courts hold that the junior
user takes the water as they find it, both in
quantity and quality; pollution resulting from
a senior user's lawful use is considered part
of the senior appropriator's user By con-
trast, the Colorado and Montana courts have
held that by rendering the watercourse unfit
for diversionary uses by a junior user, a
polluting senior user had unlawfully
appropriated the entire flow of the water-
course.
In prior appropriation states, pollution by




Groundwater allocation rules have been
used in thirty-eight cases (3%).1 The courts
have developed several rules for allocating
groundwater between conflicting users. Con-
flicts involving use, diversion and obstruction
of water in identifiable underground streams
are governed by the rules which allocate
water in surface watercourses: riparian rights
in the eastern states" and prior appropria-
tion in the western states by statute.37 Con-
flicts involving use, diversion and obstruction
of percolating groundwater are governed by
one of several allocation rules: absolute
ownership rule, American "reasonable use"
rule, comparative reasonable use rule, west-
ern "correlative rights" rule, and prior appro-
priation rule.
The prior appropriation doctrine applies
the same rules for groundwater as it does for
surface water, and thus will not be discussed
again. The western "correlative rights" doc-
trine will not be addressed in this article.
One might expect that those same rules
would govern pollution of groundwater since
the practical consequences of groundwater
contamination are no different than those of
diversion or obstruction. In both instances,
the neighboring landowner is deprived of the
use of groundwater. But such is not the case.
In the vast majority of groundwater pollution
cases, either nuisance or negligence law is
employed. Less than a handful of cases use
groundwater allocation rules to decide pollu-
tion cases. Perhaps this reflects an unstated
observation that a groundwater polluter is
denying access to water the polluter is not
using.
1. Absolute Ownership Rule
The absolute ownership rule provides that
a landowner can use percolating groundwa-
ter in any amount and at any place without
liability for injurious consequences to neigh-
bors.38 Today the absolute ownership rule
continues to be followed by 8 states. 9 The
water pollution cases employing the abso-
lute ownership rule state two reasons why
the rule is appropriate: (1) since there is no
method for the well driller to determine the
movement of percolating groundwater be-
28 See Table A.
29 Alaska. Arizona. California, Colorado, Idaho. Kansas, Montana. Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota. Texas, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming. On the prior appropriation doctrine generally, see 2 WATER AND WATER RiGHTs. supra note . §§ 12.01-.03. 13.01-.04, 17.01-.03; A. TAnLoCK,, supra note , ch.
5; 1 W. HLrrcHiNs, WATER RiGrs LAWs oF THE NiNETEEN WEsTERN STATEs cc. 7-9 (U.S. Dep't Agric. Mis. Pub. No. 1206, 1971).
30 Gunnison-Fayette Canal Co. v. Gunnison Irrigation Co., 448 P.2d 707 (Utah 1%8); Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
31 Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 100 P. 465, 470 (Ariz. 1909), affd 230 U.S. 46 (1913) [copper ore tailings covered irrigated farmlandl.
32 See e.g. Wright v. Best, 121 P.2d 702, 709 (Cal. 1942) lore crushings discharged into stream polluted domestic & irrigation waterl.
33 Conrad v. Arrowhead Hot Springs Hotel Co., 37 P. 386. 387 (Cal. 1894) [hotel spa domestic wastes polluted domestic & irrigation water in ditch diverting water from
streaml; McEvoy v. Taylor. 105 P. 851, 853 (Wash. 1909) [farm animals & geese polluted livestock waterl.
34 Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol. Mining & Milling Co., 48 P. 828, 832 (Colo. Ct.App. 1897) lore milling wastes eroded industrial hydroelectric
machinery); Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 507. 515, (1874), aff d 1 Mont. 561 (Mont. 1872).
35 See Table A.
36 Tampa Waterworks Co. u. Cline, 20 So. 780,784 (Fla. 1896); Kevil u. City of Princeton, 118 S.W. 363,365 (Ky. 1909) (by implication); Rose v. Socony Vacuum Corp.,
173 A. 627, 630 (R.I. 1934).
37 On the application of prior appropiation to groundwater generally. see WATER AND WATER RICTs, supa note 1, §§ 24.01-.07, A. TARLocK, supro note 16, c.6.
38 Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 2 N.Y.S. 289. 290-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888) [refinery residues polluted domestic weil. On the absolute ownership nmle generally, see 3 WATER AND
WATER RIGHS. supra note, §§ 21.01--07; A. TARLOCK, supra note . § 4.04; Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationshipat Law, 37 Mo. L. REv. 189, 201-02 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Wells and Streams].
39 Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, Massachusetts. Pennsylvania. Rhode Island. South Carolina and Texas.
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fore drilling, it is not fair to impose liability,40
and (2) imposing liability would deter eco-
nomic development.4 ' The absolute owner-
ship rule gives an almost absolute immunity
to groundwater polluters by permitting land-
owners to inject wastes into groundwater or
to contaminate it. Apparently because of
that draconian absence of liability under the
rule, there are no cases granting relief under
the absolute ownership rule.
2. American Rule
The second groundwater allocation rule is
the "American rule," sometimes mis-
designated as the "reasonable use rule." It
provides that a landowner may use as much
groundwater as desired without liability for
the adverse effects on any neighbor's ground-
water supply, provided the groundwater is
used on property owned by the landowner.
The landowner also may make any use of the
land affecting the movement of percolating
groundwater without liability.42 It is impor-
tant to recognize that the rule does not call
for a comparison of the landowner's uses
with the uses made of the groundwater by
the adversely affected neighbor. Today the
American rule is followed by nine states.
Until the last decade there were no water
pollution cases granting relief under the
American rule. But the concept of the rule,
although a variant of absolute ownership,
ought to impose liability for off-site contami-
nation of groundwater, because the rule
prohibits off-site groundwater use. A case in
the last decade confirms that interpretation
and imposed liability for off-site groundwater
contamination.4
3. Comparative Reasonableness Rule
The third rule of groundwater allocation
has no commonly accepted name. It em-
ploys the same concept of comparative rea
sonableness employed in the riparian doc-
trine for surface watercourses. It provides
that a landowner may use groundwater only
"The common enemy rule
provides that drainage
water is a scourge which
each landowner is entitled
to remove by any physical
means available."
to the extent that it does not unreasonably
reduce the amount of groundwater available
to any neighbor. 45 Comparative reasonable-
ness was applied to groundwater use situa-
tions because courts perceived both the
absolute ownership rule and the American
rule to be unfair to the adversely affected
groundwater user, especially where the
groundwater diverter was thought to be
overreaching.4
Like the riparian rights doctrine from
which it is derived, the comparative reason-
ableness rule has a water quality dimension
which forbids groundwater contamination
that unreasonably interferes with groundwa-
ter use by others.47 Today comparative rea-
sonableness is applied to groundwater use in
17 states, including Missouri.48
G. DIFFUSED SURFACE WATER
RULES
Cases involving pollution of drainage or
diffused surface water are relatively uncom-
mon compared to surface watercourse and
groundwater pollution cases, totaling only
twenty-two cases (2%).49 Although the courts
have developed several rules for dealing with
unwanted diffused surface water, few drain-
age pollution cases use those rules. The
three rules are the common enemy rule, civil
law rule, and reasonable use rule.'
One would expect that drainage pollution
cases using diffused surface water rules would
follow the logical implications of those rules;
that is, pollution of drainage would be al-
lowed under the common enemy rule, no
pollution would be allowed under the civil
law rule, and pollution that is not unreason-
ably excessive would be allowed under the
reasonable use rule. Courts have imposed
liability for polluting drainage water under all
three rules, however, holding respectively
that each rule bars such pollution.
40 Rose u. Socony- Vacuum Corp.. 173 A. 627. 630 (R.I. 1934).
41 Phillips u. Sun Oil Co., 121 N.E.2d 249, 251 (N.Y. 1954).
42 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466,468 (Ky. 1953) Igas well leak polluted domestic welll; See generally, 3 WATER AND WATER RIcrrs, supra note , §§ 23.01-
.03 [combining discussions of the American and comparative reasonableness rules]; A. TARL.CK. supra note , § 4.05; Davis, Wells and Streams, supra note , at 202-03.43 Alabama, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New York, North Carolina and West Virginia.
44 Hughes u. Emerald Mines Corp., 450 A.2d I (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (acid mine wastes polluted wells].
45 See generally, 3 WATER AND WATER RIirrs, supra note, §§ 22.01-.08 (combining eastem comparative reasonableness and western correlative rights cosharing rules], 23.01-
.03 (combining American and comparative reasonableness rulesl; Davis, Wells and Streams, supro note , at 203-04.
46 Jones u. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co.. 306 S.W.2d 111 (Ark. 1957); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct.App. 1971).
47 Bridgman v. Sanitary Dist., 517 N.E.2d 309, 312 (111. App. Ct. 1987) (rejecting absolute ownership) (digging of ditch diverted groundwater and caused degraded water from
other sources to pollute domestic wellI; North-East Coal Co. v. Hayes, 51 S.W.2d 960,962 (Ky. 1932) (mining subsidence caused pollution of domestic & livestock well of overlying
surface ownerl.
48 Arizona, Arkansas. California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee. Vermont. Virginia. andWisconsin.
49 See Table A.
50 On diffused surface water law generally, see Comment. The Reasonable Use Rule in Surface Water Law, 57 Mo. L. REv. 223 (1992); 2 WATER AND WATER RiGHTs, supra
note .§ 10.03; 5 id. § 59.02(b); Davis. Law of Diffused Water in Eastern Riparian States, 6 CONN. L. REv. 227 (1974); Maloney & Plager. Diffused Surface Water: Sourge
or Bounty? I NAT. RESOURCES J. 72 (1968); Dolson, Diffused Surface Waterand Riparian Rights: Legal Doctrines in Conflict. 1966 Wis. L. REv. 58; Annot.. Modem Status
of Rules Governing Interference with Drainage of Surface Waters, 93 A.L.R.3d 1193 (1979).
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1. Common Enemy Rule
The common enemy rule provides that
drainage water is a scourge which each
landowner is entitled to remove by any
physical means available. Hence, each land-
owner may deal with, dispose of, block, or
divert diffused surface water in any manner
without legal liability for the injurious conse-
quences to neighbors' lands. This gives the
upper landowner the right to discharge drain-
age on lower neighbors and it gives the lower
landowners the right to block drainage and
to pen it back on upper neighbors. It encour-
ages hydraulic warfare and lack of concern
for neighbors. Twelve states follow the com-
mon enemy rule, including Missouri.
This laissez faire approach would sug-
gest that the upper dominant landowner
could pollute drainage water at will. But
nearly all of the few cases which have consid-
ered the question have barred discharges of
polluted drainage water.52 Evidently, those
courts consider polluted drainage water to be
of a different character than unpolluted drain-
age water. But a pair of Missouri cases
suggests that perhaps de minimis pollution
in drainage water may not be actionable.'
2. Civil Law Rule
The civil law rule provides that drainage
must be allowed to follow its natural courses.
The upper landowner is not allowed to
redirect drainage artificially; the lower land-
owner is forbidden to obstruct natural drain-
age. The purpose of the rule is to preserve
the natural drainage pattern and to prohibit
landowners from taking unfair advantage of
each other. Seventeen states follow the civil
law rule.'
. One would expect the civil law rule, which
bars alteration of natural drainage flow, would
also bar pollution of drainage water. In fact,
there are eight civil law rule cases involving
polluted drainage water and all but one
granted relief.'- One case, however, sug-
gests that the lower servient land must ac-
cept contaminants in drainage water result-
ing from a reasonable use of the upper
dominant land."
3. Reasonable Use Rule
Under the reasonable use rule, each land-
owner is allowed to dispose of, block, or
divert drainage in ways which do not unrea-
sonably interfere with the use of a neighbor's
land. The rule compares the benefits and
hardships caused by a change in the natural
drainage pattern. If the hardships are unrea-
sonable under all the circumstances, there is
liability. 7 The reasonable use rule is followed
in eighteen states.
As is true for the analogous comparative
reasonableness balancing process employed
for surface watercourses and groundwater,
the theory of the reasonable use nde sugy
geststhatdrainagewatermaybedegraded in
quality so long as it does not cause an
unreasonable interference; however, there
are no cases so holding. Instead, the only
case in point holds that the reasonable use
rule does not permit drainage water to con-
tain a waste discharge, since that would add
a burden to the lower servient lands."
H. STRICT LABILITY
The doctrine of strict liability has been
applied in forty eight cases (3 %).6 It has been
employed more frequently in cases of ground-
water pollution and underground contami-
nant flow (thirty-one cases) than in surface
watercourse pollution cases (fourteen cases),
or in drainage water pollution cases (four
cases).6'
The formulations of the definition of situ-
ations calling for strict liability vary between
the states. Most commonly, activities give
rise to strict liability when they are "abnor-
mally dangerous," because of their propen-
sity to cause injury or damage or because of
the extensive harm which results from their
going. out of controL The persons engaging
in such activities should be expected to
compensate for consequential injuries and
damage, because it is wmreasonable and
contrary to pubic poky to expect the in-
jured or damaged persons to assume the
burden of injury or damage under any cir-
cunstances. More water pollution cases have
employed the common law version of the
rule" rather than the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
51 Arizona. Arkansas. Indiana. Maine, Missouri. Montana. Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma. South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington.
52 Baltzeger v. Carolina Midland Ry., 32 S.E. 358. 359-60 (S.C. 1899); G.L. Webster Co. v. Steelman, 1 S.E.2d 305, 312 (Va. 1939) Icannerywaste discharged into drain
leading to creek & estuary caused odors and killed shellfish - damages granted for odors on nuisance theory, but damages denied for loss of seafood").
53 Casanover v. Villanova Really Co., 209 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948), denied relief for a clay deposit of several inches settling out of drainage water. Later, Wells
v. State Highway Comm 'n. 503 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1973), granted relief for a massive silt deposit settling out of drainage water.
54 Alabama. Colorado, Georgia. Idaho. Illinois. Iowa, Kansas. Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan. New Mexico, Oregon. Pennsylvania. South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas. and
Vennont
55 See e.g. Fenwick v. Bluebird Coal Co.. 140 N.E.2d 129, 131 (111. Ct. App. 1957) lacid mine drainage discharged into ditch flowed into adjacent timberland, killing trees];
Harbison v. City of Hillsboro. 204 P. 613. 618 (Or. 1922) Icity treated sewage effluent plugged drainage ditch with sediment and penned back drainage water.
56 Niagara Oil Co. u. Jackson, 91 N.E. 825, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 1910).
57 RESIATrMENr 2D. TORTS. § 821A - 833 (1979). applying private nuisance law.
58 California. Connecticut. Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi. Nevada. New Hampshire, New Jersey. North Carolina, North Dakota. Ohio.
Rhode Island. Utah. West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
59 Kallevig a Holgren, 197 N.W.2d 714, 718 (Minn. 1972) lapartment septic tank effluent. combined with pothole drainage, was directed onto neighboring land, poisoning
the soill.
60 See Table A.
61 See Tables B-D.
62 See City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611.615 (7th Cir. 1989) IPCBs; United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 722 F.Supp.
960. 966 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) ILove Canall; Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp. 647 F.Supp. 303, 313 15(W.D.Tenn. 1986), aff'd in part, revad in part on orher grounds 855
F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Behle v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 17 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929) (dictum).
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view.63 Strict liability is imposed most com-
monly in the mining and oil and gas produc-
tion industries and in gasoline retailing.
I. TRESPASS
The trespass doctrine has been used in
fifty-eight water pollution cases (4 %).1 A
trespass is defined as a nonpermissive and
unprivileged physical intrusion or invasion of
another's land which violates the owner's
right to exclusive possession and to exclude
others. It includes intrusions on, beneath and
above the surface of the land." Trespass is
an entry without lawful authority,' and an
unprivileged intentional intrusion of another's
possession.7 An intention to cause the entry
is not required; an accident or mistake is
sufficient.6" The activity must be done where
it is reasonably foreseeable that intrusion by
foreign matter will occur.' Trespass, rather
than nuisance, is used when a physical inva-
sion is involved.70
J. UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
Pollution lawsuits have been decided un-
der constitutional taking and inverse con-
demnation theories in fourty-eight cases
(3%)." Those theories have been used only
in lawsuits involving permanent pollution
caused by governmental entities and private
entities with eminent domain power.
The federal government and state govem-
ments are prohibited from taking property
without paying compensation. The Fifth
Amendment limiting the powers of the fed-
eral government provides that ". . . nor
shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation."n All state con-
stitutions have parallel prohibitions. 3 The
unconstitutional taking and inverse condem-
nation theories can be invoked when the
government fails to pay compensation for an
activity which constitutes a taking.74
Inverse condemnation is a form of uncon-
stitutional taking.7 5 It is inverse only in the
sense that the lawsuit is brought by the
condemnee instead of the condemnor.76
The suit is for compensation for a condem-
nation which should have occurred, but did
not .n7
Most of the water pollution taking cases
are inverse condemnation cases. Many courts
have concluded that the discharge of wastes
from government-owned facilities which
causes consequential damages to private
property constitutes a taking." Takings oc-
cur when the government takes possession
of private property, when it deprives its
owner of an essential attribute of property
rights,80 when there is a nontrespassory
interference which results in a material dimi-
nution of land value,' or when there is a
substantial denial of the use of land. 2
K. STATUTORY LIABILITY
A miscellaneous collection of state stat-
utes prohibit various activities which can
cause water pollution and impose liability for
their violation. Of these, the statutes which
generate the most cases are those prohibit-
ing the discharge of brine from oil wells."
This theory is the sixth most commonly
used, followed in 109 cases (8%).-
Nearly all water pollution regulatory stat-
utes preserve common law rights and rem-
63 RESTATEMNT 2D, TORTS §§ 519-20 (1979). See, e.g., Bunyak v. Clyde J. Yancey & Sons Dairy. Inc., 438 So.2d 891, 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983): Williams v. AmocoProd. Co., 734 P.2d 1113. 1122-23 (Kan. 1987).
64 See Table A.
65 Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald. Inc., 300 So.2d 94, 96-97 (Ala. 1974); Wells v. State Highway Comm n, 503 S.W.2d 689, 693 (Mo. 1973). On trespass generally, see1 W. RoDGs, supro note . § 2.15, at 126-28; F. HARPER. F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, LAW or TORTS § 2.1, at 3 (2d ed. 1986); W. PRossR & W. KirroN. TORTS, § 13. at 67-84;R. CUNNINCGIAM, W. STOFRLUCK & D.WiirtaAN, LAw OF PROPERTY § 7.1, at 410-12 (stud. ed. 1984). See also RESTATEMENT 2U, ToRTs § 158 (1965).
66 Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.. 647 F.Supp. 303, 317-18 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affd in part, rev'd in part 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).67 Wellesley Hills Really Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F.Supp. 93, 99 (D. Mass. 1990) Isubsequent owner of land contaminated by gasoline sued prior owner for violation
of oil release liability statute & common law].
68 Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F.Supp. 303, 317-18 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). affd in part, revd in part 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).69 W.T. Ratliff Co. v. Henley. 405 So.2d 141. 145-46 (Ala. 1981) lessee's sand pile washed onto lessor's adjacent land after heavy rain)
70 Wells v. State Highway Comm n, 503 S.W.2d 689, 693 (Mo. 1973) [soil erosion silt in drainage water filled lake bed].
71 See Table A.
72 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
73 See, e.g.. Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 26 (1945), which provides: "That private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
74 On water-related regulatory takings generally. see5 WATER AND WATER RioITs, supra note ,§ 61.03(c)(7); Klock & Cook, The Condemningof America: Regulatory -Ta kings -
and the Purchase by the United States of America's Wetlands. 18 SETON HAL L. REv. 330, 339-354 (1988).
75 On inverse condemnation generally, see 4 WATER AND WATER Rict-rrs, supra note , § 38.05; J. NOWAK & R. ROTUNDA, supra note , § 11.14; 1 W. RoDGERs. supra note
, § 2.17; 2 J. SACKMAN. NiCiOs's TiiE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.21 (3d ed. 1990).
76 J. NowAK & R. ROTUNDA, supro note 64. § 11.14.
77 In recent years, some inverse condemnation suits have sought invalidation of excessive police power regulation. See. e.g.. Agins v. City of Tiburon. 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979).
affd 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Most water pollution inverse condemnation cases seek compensation.
78 See e.g., King v. City of Rolla. 130 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Mo. Ct.App. 1939) [treated city sewage polluted livestock water & caused odorsl.
79 Evans v. City of Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
80 Foss v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 309 A.2d 339, 344 (Me. 1973) |snow removal operations caused salt todrain off road & polluted domestic water, killed crops & destroyedplumbing).
81 Id.; Twitty v. State. 354 S.E.2d 296, 303 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
82 Crane v. Brintnall. 278 N.E.2d 703, 706 (Ohio C.P. 1972) treated sewage polluted a manmade recreational lake. causing algal bloomsl.
83 See e.g.. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-172 (Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.93 (1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52. § 296 (1991).
84 See Table A.
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edies;as however, most cases interpreting
those provisions hold that no common law
private liability arises for their violation. 6
L. PRESCRIPTION
Under the various doctrines governing
water use and allocation in water pollution
cases, the doctrine of prescription plays a
dual role. Water use rights and the right to
discharge wastes can be acquired by pre-
scription. Prescription also can be used as a
defense against an enforcement action. Many
water pollution cases, sixty seven cases (5%)
have employed the prescription doctrine,
mostly as a defense."'
A prescriptive right, adverse and superior
to the right of the owner of the property
right, can be acquired analogously to adverse
possession." The right to pollute must be
open and notorious for the entire statutory
period. It must be visible or detectable enough
that the water user against whom the statute
of limitations is running either knows, or
should know, that the user's rights have been
invaded.' The discharge must be continu-
ous' and adverse, and must continue for the
entire period of the statute of limitations.9'
Periodic uses are treated as continuous if
they occur whenever the nature and circum-
stances of the use require."
A prescriptive right can be acquired to
discharge wastes in abrogation of riparian 9 3
prior appropriation," groundwater, or drain-
age rights,95 or to maintain a private nui-
sance." The right of the public to enjoin a
public nuisance, however, cannot be pre-
scribed.97 Nor can the right to enjoin a public
nuisance be prescribed from a private indi-
vidual with special damage.98 Notably, a
perfected prescriptive right does not protect
enlarged or changed waste discharges which
have continued for less than the period of the
statute of limitations."
M. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is a common law
theory under which waste discharges can be
restrained and the assimilative capacity of
watercourses protected. Its principal use has
been to protect the physical integrity of
public watercourses. It has seen relatively
little use to protect those waters from pollu-
tion, being followed in only eight cases.0
Nonetheless, its potential for protecting wa-
tercourses from pollution is great.
The public trust doctrine imposes an ob-
ligation on the states, as trustees, to preserve
navigable waters for use by the public. It
provides that the state owns the beds of
public waters and the waters themselves, not
as proprietor, but as trustee for the benefit of
the public. The state cannot relinquish such
title unless the conveyance would further the
purposes of the public trust. Since the state
had original title, exercise of state powers to
enforce the public trust does not constitute a
taking, regardless of the extent to which the
private bed titles are diminished in value or
usefulness. The state as public trustee has a
minimum obligation to protect the public
rights of navigation and fishery.'' During
the twentieth century, the public trust has
been expanded to protect recreational boat-
ing, swimming, wading, hunting, and other
water-related public uses. 0 2 The public trust
85 See. e.g.. Clean Water Act § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. §1365(e) (1993); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449(e), 42 U.S.C. § 300)-8(e) (1993); Missouri Clean Water Law, Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 644.131 (1986).
86 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983).
87 See Tables A-D.
88 On prescription generally, see 1 WATER AND WATi RIam supra note, § 7.04(c) 2 id. § 17.03(c); A. TARLoCK, supra note , §§ 3.19. 4.0841, 5.18131; 2 W. HUrcHINs,
supra note . 328-427: 1 W. RoDGERs, supra note . § 2.10(A); R. CuNMwMm, W. STOEBUCK & D. WirrMAN, supra note , § 8.71; 3 R. POWF. & P. ROHAN, LAW OF REAL
PRoPRr1 413(1952-92): 7 id. 11 1012[2ib; 2 AMERICAN LAW Of PRoPERr §§ 8.44-.63. 8.68-.69 (1952. supp. 1962); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY SERVFTUDES §§ 457-65, 477-
81, 506 (1944); McCoy. The Role of Adverse Possession in Water Law, 10 -any. EwvrL.. L. REV. 257, 261-266 (1986).
89 Conestee Mills v. City of Greenvlle. 158 S.E. 113, 115-16 (S.C 193l
90 Cook Indus., Inc. v. Carlson, 334 F.Supp. 809, 818 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
91 City of Cleveland v. Standard Bag & Paper Co., 74 N.E. 206, 208 (Ohio 1905).
92 Anneburg v. Kurtz, 28 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1944).
93 City of Richmond v. Test, 48 N.E. 610. 614 (Ind. Ct.App. 1897). Kennebunk, K. & W. Water Dist. v. Maine Turnpike Auth.. 84 A.2d 433, 439-40 (Me. 1951).
94 See Joeger v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 276 P. 1017 (Cal. 1929); Chessman v. Hale, 79 P. 254 (Mont. 1905).
95 See Blue Ridge Poultry & Egg Co., Inc. v. Clark. 176 S.E.2d 323 (Va. 1970).
96 Smith v. City of Sedalia, 53 S.W. 907. 910 (Mo. 1899) (by implication). Notably, three cases hold that the right to abate a private nuisance cannot be prescribed. Lawton
v. Herrick, 76 A. 986. 989 (Conn. 1910); City of Oxford v. S.E. Spears, 87 So.2d 914, 917 (Miss. 1956); Vian v. Sheffield Bldg. & Dev. Co.. 88 N E-2d 410.414. (Ohio
Ct. App. 1948).
97 Gardenhire v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 44 P.2d 280, 283(Kan. 1935); Gundy v. Village of Merrill, 230 N.W. 163. 163(Mich. 1930); City of Corsicana v. King, 3 S.W.2d
857. 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Meiners v. Frederick Miller Brewing Co., 47 N.W. 430, 430 (Wis. 1890).
98 Nolan v. City of New Britain, 38 A. 703, 708 (Conn. 1897).
99 Smith v. City of Sedalia. 53 S.W. 907, 910 (Mo. 1899); City of Walla Walla v. Conkey, 492 P.2d 589. 595 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)
100 See Table A.
101 Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); National Audubon Soc y v. Superior Court. 658 P.2d 709(Cal. 1983), cert. denied464 U.S. 977 (1983. Superior
Public Rights. Inc. v. State Dep't of Natural Resources. 263 N.W.2d 290. 296 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)_ On the public trust doctrine generally, see 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS,
supra note . § 30.02; A. TARLOCK, supra note . §§ 5. 13131, 8.04-.05; Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine. 19 ENvL. L. 485 (1989); 1 W. RoDGExs,
supra note .§ 2.20; Ausness. Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine. and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. lu.. L. RE. 407,409-16,421-28; Comment. State
Citizen Rights Respecting Great water Resource Allocation: From Rome to New Jersey, 25 Ri 1TcIR's L. Riv. 571 (1971); J. SAx. DEI.NING THr ENVIRONMrNT c. 7(1970); Sax,
The Public Trust in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mini. L. REv. 471 (1970. 2 F. GRAn. supra note , § 10.05.
102 Orion Corp. v. State. 747 P.2d 1062. 1073 (Wash. 1987), cert denied 486 U.S 1022 (1988) State v. Bleck. 338 N.W.2d 492, 498 (Wis. 1983)
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doctrine applies to all public waters navi-
gable or floatable under state law. 03
In water pollution cases, the courts have
held that under the public trust doctrine the
state holds public waters in trust for the
benefit of the public,'"1 that the doctrine
imposes on the state an obligation to protect
the public's right to use public waters for
public uses,'0 and that the state may not
substantially impair the public's use of those
waters.' Alienation of the bed is barred by
the public trust doctrine. 07 The doctrine
applies to interferences with fishington and
the physical integrity of the waters them-
selves. '0
The state, as public trustee, has standing
to enforce the public trust. 0 It is not so clear
whether members of the public, as beneficia-
ries of the trust, can do so. Some courts have
held that members of the public can sue the
state if it regulates water uses in derogation
of the public trust or abdicates its trust
obligations.' In some states, a member of
the public can enforce public trust rights
directly against a violator."I In other states,
however, a private individual cannot enforce
the trust."' 3
Few water pollution cases have been de-
cided under the public trust doctrine, and all
but one of those have involved coastal wa-
ters. Maine, Maryland, and New Jersey have
applied the doctrine under federal admiralty
law"4 and state law." 5 Virginia has nomi-
nally accepted the doctrine, but holds that a
municipality has a sovereign right to dis-
charge wastes into public waters without
liability." 6 New York has rejected use of the
doctrine in pollution cases.'
N. NO DECISIONAL THEORY CASES
A surprising number of water pollution
cases do not recite any legal theory to sup-
port their decisions. "No decisional theory"
cases compromise 154 cases (11%), thus
these are the fifth most commonly used
theory. Over half of these cases were decided
in Kansas and Oklahoma (eighty-seven cases).
About one-third of the cases in Oklahoma
were of the "no decisional theory" deci-
sions."" Because many other cases reciting
particular legal theories were decided in
those states at the same time, it is not
possible to ascribe these no decisional theory
decisions to any particular theory. The cases
in both states are focused on brine disposal
from oil wells, refinery storage leaks, and
pipeline leaks.
Particularly curious in each of these states
is that the no decisional theory cases are
mixed among many other cases reciting
specified theories, particularly private nui-
sance, negligence, and statutory liability. For
example, in Oklahoma between 1935 and
1940, there were 70 decisions, of which two
oil well and six non-oil well cases used private
nuisance law: four oil well and two pipeline
leak cases applied negligence law; thirty oil
well, one pipeline leak, and one refinery spill
cases relied on a statute creating liability for
polluting domestic and livestock water sup-
plies with oil well brine and wastes; and
twenty-nine oil well and two non-oil well
cases failed to specify a decisional theory. A
similar pattern of cases also exists in Kansas
throughout the twentieth century.
Several comments are in order. First, it
should be recognized that the cases are not
inconsistent in result. Generally, the courts
granted relief for proven pollution under
each of the theories (or non-theory). Second,
the courts more frequently did specify a
decisional theory in non-oil well cases. Third,
even in oil well cases, a majority of decisions
in Kansas and Oklahoma specified a deci-
sional theory. However, it seems amazing
that nearly half the oil well cases in Okla-
homa would fail to specify a decisional theory.
Generally, the no decisional theory cases
hold that polluting a water supply or well was
unlawful and granted relief. Fourth, underly-
ing all oil well cases in Kansas and Oklahoma
are statutes, cited in eighteen Kansas (56%)
and sixty-six Oklahoma cases (62%), which
103 Hayes v. State. 496 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Ark. 1973); Kerpelman v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 276 A.2d 56, 61 (Md. 1971). cert. denied 404 U S. 858 (1971);
Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519, 55 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Wis. 1952); see on navigability generally, 4 WATER AND WATER RicHrs, supra note §§ 32.01-
.03; Ausness. Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILu. L. REv. 407, 433-34 (1986): Davis, State Ownership of Beds
of Inland Waters- A Summary and Reexamination, 57 NEB. L. REv. 665. 674-76 nn. 50-51, 680-81 nn. 68-71. 699-700 n. 152 (1978); Johnson & Austin. Recreational
Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 33-52 (1967).
104 Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 691 (Va. 1932).
105 City of Hampton v. Watson, 89 S.E. 81 (Va. 1916).
106 Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 691 (Va. 1932).
107 Evans v. City of Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199, 207 ( N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (dictum) [doctrine rejectedl.
108 Id.; Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 691 (Va. 1932).
109 Maine v. MV Tamano. 357 F.Supp. 1097. 1099-1101 (D. Me. 1973).
110 Kerpelman v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 276 A.2d 56, 61 (Md. 1971). cert. denied 404 U.S. 858 (1971); State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407. 413 (Wis. 1974).
111 See e.g.. Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514. 522, 55 N.W.2d 40 (Wis. 1952)
112 See e.g.. Mai. COMP. L. ANN. § 691.1202 (1987) (MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (Callaghan 1980); State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407. 413 (Wis. 1974).
113 See e.g., Kerpelman v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 276 A.2d 56,60 (Md. 1971). cert. denied 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
114 Burgess v. MAV Tamano, 370 F.Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973), offd mem. 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977).
115 Maine v. MV Tamano, 357 F.Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973); Maryland, Dep't of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp.. 350 F.Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972); State,
Dep't of Enut'l Prot. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.. 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976).
116 Commonwealth v. City of Newport News, 164 S.E. 689 (Va. 1932) 1sewage polluted oyster bed in navigable watersi.
117 Evans v. City of Johnstown, 410 N.Y.S.2d 199. 207 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
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prohibited polluting a domestic or livestock
water supply with brine or wastes discharged
from an oil and gas well."' Probably, the
existence of those statutes was so well known
that they formed the unstated basis for the no
decisional theory cases involving oil well
discharges.
The dominance of private nuisance, pub-
lic nuisance, negligence, and riparian rights
doctrines suggests that many plaintiffs are
not aware of the other doctrines which may
be used to deal with water pollution prob-
lems. The large proportion of no decisional
theory cases in Oklahoma (31%) and Kansas
(18%), however, suggests that lawyers plead-
ing plaintiffs' cases and judges may be un-
aware of any of the doctrines which might be
used.120
PART II
PATTERNS IN FACT SITUATIONS AND
DOCTRINES IN CASES IN MISSOURI
AND THE MIDWEST
Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma have
had 375 cases, over twenty percent of the
common law water pollution decisions re-
ported nationwide. As shown in Table A, in
Kansas and Missouri, private nuisance domi-
nates the water pollution cases. In Kansas,
private nuisance is followed by statutory
liability, while in Missouri it is followed by
negligence. In Oklahoma, "no decisional
theory" and statutory liability dominate, fol-
lowed by negligence and private nuisance.
In three other surrounding states, as well,
Arkansas, Illinois and Iowa, private nuisance
dominates, followed by negligence in Arkan-
sas, public nuisance and riparian rights in
Illinois, and riparian rights in Iowa. These
trends remain fairly constant, with some
variation when looking at the specific types
of impacted watercourse, as shown in Tables
B-D.
In Missouri and Oklahoma, the largest
number of cases concern surface water pol-
lution, while in Kansas, the largest number of
cases concern groundwater pollution. Some
variations may be attributable to the fact that
Oklahoma has much more pollution from oil
and gas development than does Missouri.
Kansas, however, also has more oil and gas
development than Missouri, yet shows dif-
ferent case trends than Oklahoma.
Interestingly, as shown in Table E, in most
states in the region, including Missouri, plain-
tiffs were successful in over 70 percent of the
cases with relief generally in the form of
damages. In Iowa, however, plaintiffs were
successful in only sixty-one percent of the
cases with relief generally in the form of
damages, in line with the national pattern.
Only in Illinois did injunctions form an impor-
tant element of relief.
This article intends to enlarge understand-
ing of the doctrines used in water pollutior
cases along with other factors present in thE
cases. To accomplish this, I have outlinet
how these doctrines apply in water pollutior
situations and have cited representative cases
This analysis should improve understandin(
of case precedent and facilitate use of the
various doctrines in water pollution cases ir
the future by attorneys dealing with wate
pollution.
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119 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-904(aXl) (Supp. 1992) [regulatory authority over brine disposal); OKL. STAT. ANN. § 17:53 (1986) [plugging abandoned oil wells], and § 52:29
(1991) Ipollution of livestock water with oil well brinel.
120 See Table A.
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KEYz PrN-Private Nuisance PuN-Public Nuisance Neg-Neligence RR-Riparian Rights PA-Prior Appropristion GW-Groundwater Allocation RulesDSW-Diffumed Surface Water SLStrict Liability T-Trespass UT-UnconstitutionalTaking SI-Statutory LiabilityNDT-No Decisional Theory PT- Public Trust TT-Total
Table A
WATER POLLUTION CASES
(state v. doctrine - 1401 cases)
PrN PuN Nag RR PA GW DSW SL T
AR 14 4 5 2 -
EL 17 9 4 8 - 1 4 I
IA 16 - 1 2 - - .
KS 22 4 7 5 3
MO 32 5 8 2 
-2 1 2
OK 33 6 43 
- - . I I I
TOT US 531 181 271 222 28 38 22 48 58
U StL NIur P TOT
2 - 2 29
- 3 47
- I20
- 18 13 73
7 6 65
- 78 74 237
48 109 154 8 1719
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--- --- --
Table B
WATER POLLUTION CASES -- SURFACE WATERCOURSES
(state v. doctrine - 1401 cases)
PrN PuN Neg RR PA GW DSW
AR 10 4 2 - - -
IL 10 6 1 8 . . .
IA 13 - - 2 - - -
KS 12 2 2 - - - -
MO 25 5 2 - - -
OK 23 5 24 - - - .
SL T U StL NDr PT TOT
S - 2 - 2 - 20
. - - - 2 - 27
. . - - - - 15
1 
- 5 8 - 30
. I 6 - 3 - 42
I I - 48 54 - 176
S - 2 96 222 28- - 14 20 29 59 105 1 1035
....... . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .... . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .
Table C
WATER POLLUION CASES -- GROUNDWATER
(state v. doctrine - 1401 camss)
PrN PuN Neg RR PA GW DSW SL T U StL NDT PT TOTAR 3 - 2 - . 5
L 6 3 2 -41- 
- - 16
I 3 - I 4KS 9 2 4 -
- I 4 3 11I 4 
- 38
MO 4 - 7 . . .
- 2 - 13OK 5 - 8 
- -
-
. 5 6 - 24
TOT US 155 28 126 - - 37 - 31 20 5 22 18 444
. ...............................................................................................- 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --........................................
Table D
WATER POLLU77ON CASES -- DRAINAGE WATER
(state v.doctrine - 1401 cases)
PrN PuN Neg RR PA GWDSW SL T UT StL NDT PT TOT
AR I - 3 - - . . 4





- 2 -- 
---- 3 1 -7
MO 3 - - - - 31 l- 1 - 11OK 5 1 11 - . . I . - - 28 13 - 59TOT US 37 6 39 -
- 23 4 14 8 32 25 - 188
...- ...-..-. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ...- -  .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . ...-.. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..-...-.. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .
WA
damages injunction both subtor remand
AR 10 5 - 15 1
EL 12 14 - 26 3
IA 10 1 - 11
KS 29 I 30 5
MO 21 2 1 24 8
OK 123 1 - 124 23
TOT US 450 158 45 653 186
Table E
TER POUITON CASES - RELIEF GRANTED
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Frank v. Environmental Sanitation Management, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1985).
(landfill leachate escaping into stream polluted livestock water)
Bartlett v. Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 351 S.W.2d 214 (Mo.App. 1961).
(mine tailings polluted livestock water and killed crops)
Hillhouse v. City of Aurora, 351 S.W.2d 214 (Mo.App. 1961).
(city sewage caused odors around house)
Newman v. City of El Dorado Springs, 292 S.W.2d 314 (Mo.App. 1956).
(city sewage polluted livestock water and caused odors around house)
Divelbiss v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 272 S.W.2d 839 (Mo.App. 1954).
(oil well brine killed livestock)
Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (1942).
(city sewage polluted stream)
Thompson v. City of Springfield, 134 S.W.2d 1082 (Mo.App. 1939).
(city sewage caused odors)
Person v. City of Independence, 114 S.W.2d 175 (Mo.App. 1938).
(city sewage caused odors around house)
Riggs v. City of Springfield, 96 S.W.2d 392 (Mo.App. 1936), rev'd 126 S.W.2d 1144 (Mo.App. 1939).
(city sewage caused odors around house)
City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 234 (1933),
rev'd on other grounds 61 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1932).
(inadequately treated city sewage damaged a pasture)
McCleery v. City of Marshall, 65 S.W.2d 1042 (Mo.App. 1933).
(sewer extension discharged in ravine polluted stream & caused odors around farm)
City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1932 - Mo.),
rev'd on other grounds 289 U.S. 334 (1933).
(inadequately treated city sewage damaged a pasture)
Kent v. City of Trenton, 48 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 1931).
(city sewage polluted domestic & livestock water and caused odors around house)
Fansler v. City of Sedalia, 176 S.W. 1102 (Mo.App. 1915).
(city sewage polluted livestock water)
Luckey v. City of Brookfield, 151 S.W. 201 (Mo. App. 1912).
(city sewage polluted livestock water)
Kellogg v. City of Kirksville, 112 S.W.2d 296 (Mo.App. 1908) and 129 S.W. 57 (1910)






no: statute of limitations








no: statute of limitations
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Smith v. City of Sedalia, 81 S.W. 165 (Mo. 1904).(city sewage polluted domestic & livestock water)
City of Chillicothe v. Bryan, 77 S.W. 465 (Mo.App. 1903).(city sewage polluted livestock water)
Schumacher v. Shawhan, 67 S.W. 717 (Mo.App. 1902).(food processing wastes polluted domestic & livestock water)
Smith v. City of Sedalia, 53 S.W. 907 (Mo. 1899).(city sewage polluted domestic & livestock water)







Smiths v. McConathy, 11 Mo. 518 (1848).
(meat processing wastes & farm animal wastes polluted domestic & livestock water and
caused odors around house)
Percolating Groundwater
Village of Claycomo v. Kansas City, 635 S.W.2d 365 (Mo.App. 1980).(leachate from landfill polluted groundwater and wells)
Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 37 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1931),
rev'd 2 S.W.2d 115 (Mo.App. 1927)(pipeline leak pollute domestic well)
Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co., 108 S.W. 580 (Mo.App. 1908).(oil & grease escaping into creek polluted domestic well)
Diffused Surface Water
Hulshof v. Noranda Aluminum, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. App. 1992).(industrial drainage water containing wastes & toxic chemicals in drainage ditch inundated
farm, killing crops & contaminating soil)
Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Mo.App. 1951).
(city combined sewer overflow flowed onto residential land, causing odors around houses &polluting domestic well)
Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc., 461 S.W.2d 784 (Mo. 1970).(feedlot sewage lagoon effluent, with accumulated surface water, flowed past farmhouse, caused
odors & polluted livestock pond)
Surface Contaminant Flow (without drainage water)
Bower v. Hog Builders, Inc. [see Diffused Surface Water]
PUBLIC NUISANCE
Surface Watercourses
State ex rel. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1980).(barite mine settling basin ruptured, discharging mine tailings into river)
Stewart v. City of Springfield [see Private Nuisance)










no: statute of limitations
no: not proven
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Schoen v. Kansas City, 65 Mo.App. 134 (1895)
(city sewage polluted stream & caused odors around houses)
Edmondson v. City of Moberly, 11 S.W. 990 (Mo. 1889).





Reddick v. Pippin, 421 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1967).
(sewage lagoon overflow allegedly polluted domestic well)
Bollinger v. Mungle, 175 S.W.2d 912 (Mo.App. 1943).
(gas station gasoline leak polluted domestic well)
no: no causal connection
no violation of right
Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Decker, 32 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1929).
(oil pipeline leaks polluted domestic & livestock well)
Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 2 S.W.2d 115 (Mo.App. 1927),
rev'd on other grounds 37 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1931).
(pipeline leak polluted domestic well)
Chapman v. American Creosoting Co., 286 S.W. 837 (Mo.App. 1926).
(creosote escaping into ditch saturated ground and polluted domestic well)
Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 247 S.W. 472 (Mo.App. 1923).
(pipeline leak polluted domestic well)
Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat & Water Co. [see Private Nuisance]
Diffused Surface Water
Casanover v. Villanova Realty Co., 209 S.W.2d 556 (Mo.App. 1948).
(subdivision drainage scoured driveways, penetrated basement walls & left clay deposit on land)





no: not entitled to relief under rule
RIPARIAN RIGHTS: REASONABLE USE RULE
Surface Watercourses
City of Cape Girardeau v. Hunze, 284 S.W. 471 (Mo. 1926).
sewer might pollute stream; "reasonable use" applied in eminent domain case)
Joplin Consol. Mining Co. v. City of Joplin, 27 S.W. 406 (Mo. 1894).
(city sewage might pollute ore washing water)
eminent domain compensation (city
amount upehld
no: procedural error
DIFFUSED SURFACE WATER RULES: COMMON ENEMY RULE
Diffused Surface Water
Wells v. State Highway Comm'n, 503 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1973).
(soil erosion silt in drainage water filled lake bed)
Casanover v. Villanova Realty Co. [see Negligence]
TRESPASS
Diffused Surface Water
Wells v. State Highway Comm'n [see Diffused Surface Water-Common Enemy]
damages
no: not entitled to relief under rule
damages
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UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING
Surface Watercourses
Lewis v. City of Potosi, 317 S.W.2d 623 (Mo.App. 1958).
(treated city sewage polluted domestic & livestock water)
King v. City of Rolla, 130 S.W.2d 697 (Mo.App. 1939).
(treated city sewage polluted livestock water & caused odors)
Riggs v. City of Springfield, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (1939),
rev'd 96 S.W.2d 392 (Mo.App. 1936).
(city sewage caused odors around house)
Smith v. City of Sedalia, 149 S.W. 597 (Mo. 1912).
(city sewer polluted a stream at a farm)
Diffused Surface Water
Wells v. State Highway Comm'n [see Diffused Surface Water-Common Enemy]
damages
no: statute of limitations





Riggs v. City of Springfield [see Unconstitutional Taking]
Kent v. City of Trenton [see Private Nuisance
Fansler v. City of Sedalia [see Private Nuisance]
City of Chillicothe v. Bryan [see Private Nuisance]
Smith v. City of Sedalia [see Private Nuisance]




no: comparative convenience doctrine
Surface Watercourses
Lewis v. City of Potosi, 348 S.W.2d 577 (Mo.App. 1961).
(treated city sewage polluted domestic & livestock water)
Percolating Groundwater
Windle v. City of Springfield, 8 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1928),
transferred from 275 S.W. 585 (Mo. App. 1925).
(city sewage discharged into cave polluted spring & lake and caused odors)
Diffused Surface Water
Manner v. H.E.T., Inc., 739 S.W.2d 724 (Mo.App. 1987). no: no causal connection






There were no Missouri cases using these theories.
NO DECISIONAL THEORY
damages
damages
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